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ABSTRACT 
This paper begins a process of organizing knowledge of health information security threats into a comprehensive catalog.  
We begin by describing our risk management perspective of health information security, and then use this perspective to 
motivate the development of a health information threat tree.  We describe examples of three threats, breaking each down 
into its key risk-related data attributes:  threat source and action, the health information asset and its vulnerability, and 
potential controls. The construction of such a threat catalog is argued to be useful for risk assessment and to inform public 
health care policy.  As no threat catalog is ever complete, guidance for extending the health information security threat tree is 
given. 
Keywords 
Health Information Privacy, Information Security, Risk Assessment, Threat Modeling. 
INTRODUCTION 
Technological progress brings the promise of advancement, but not without accompanying risk.  Advances in electronic 
health records (EHR) management is no exception.  EHR advances hold the promise of improving health care outcomes, 
reducing medical and medication errors, and reducing health care cost by making information readily available for use in any 
place, at any time, and in the right format. As with other industries, however, the health care industry has experienced the 
cost of technological advancement, as threats to patient privacy and information security are ever present.  The threats of 
unauthorized data access, disclosure, manipulation, loss, and corruption present risks to patients, institutions, and health care 
outcomes. Moreover, the complex interplay of technologies, people, policies, and legislation in an increasingly wireless 
networked world make the health information systems environment an interesting and challenging information security and 
privacy landscape.  
This paper builds on recent research providing frameworks and taxonomies for cataloging threats to health information 
security and privacy.  We start with a basic set of assumptions about health information security and privacy.  The first 
assumption is that we take a risk management view of information security.  By information security, we mean the process of 
identifying threats to information assets and the analysis of those threats in order to select countermeasures that mitigate the 
risk posed by the threats.  Information assets in the health care context might include data (or information, terms used 
interchangeably) in all of its forms, and other technologies, such as hardware, software, networks, and electronic devices, and 
people, procedures, and the physical infrastructure.  By considering information in all its forms, we mean not only electronic 
records stored in a computer system, but also paper-based records, records such as X-rays, and that which can be 
photographed, such as patient injuries.  Procedures include processes of health care institutions, including business processes 
and patient-care processes.  People, particularly patients and their families, but also health care institutional personnel 
vendors and others in the health care extended enterprise (Appari and Johnson, 2010), are the most important part of any 
information system.   Another assumption is that a threat is any action posed by a human or non-human source that threatens 
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA) of information, where confidentiality involves preventing unauthorized 
disclosure, integrity is about preventing data modification, and availability is about making data accessible for authorized use 
when needed (Nematzadeh and Camp, 2010).  The ultimate outcomes of threats to CIA may include, but are not limited to, 
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exposing patients to economic harm, mental anguish, and social stigma; enabling identity theft and medical identity theft; and 
impacts on medical decision making, including delayed treatment and ineffective decisions (Appari and Johnson, 2010; 
Johnson, 2009); financial impacts on third party payers; and failures due to inaccurate data in medical research.   
The current research will utilize existing taxonomies of threats, both in the health information context and in the general case 
of information systems security.  Existing taxonomies usually use one or both of the threat-source or threat action as an 
organizing principle.  Threat-sources either intentionally exploit or accidentally trigger vulnerabilities in information assets.  
Threat actions are the methods, or the manner in which threat-sources exploit/trigger vulnerabilities.  One of the existing 
sources of health information security and privacy threats that will inform the current research include Kotz (2011), who 
provides a taxonomy consisting of 25 threats, organized around three main categories:  identity threats, access threats, and 
disclosure threats.  Samy, Ahmad, and Ismail (2010) organized health information systems threats around 22 categories, 
finding five areas to be most critical:  power failure/loss, acts of human error or failure, technological obsolescence, hardware 
failures or errors, and software failures or errors.  More general threat categories can be found (Stoneburner, Goguen, and 
Feringa 2002; Whitman, 2003).  The NIST 800-30 provides a categorization of threat sources in six categories:  human-
deliberate, human-unintentional, technical, operational, environmental, and natural.  Whitman identified 12 categories of 
threat actions. Another source of health information privacy threats is the most widely cited law, the Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  The privacy implications of HIPAA influenced the development of the threat 
tree through the health information privacy literature that we reviewed.   
THE HEALTH INFORMATION THREAT TREE 
Our approach to health information threat modeling involves the use of threat trees and threat catalogs.  The threat tree is 
organized around the goal of an attacker or outcome of a threat, depending on whether the threat is intentional or not. At the 
top level, or root, of the threat tree, is node 1, which is labeled threaten health information asset.  With an orientation on 
information (data) as the primary vulnerable asset that leads to risks to other health information assets, we then focus on two 
main threats:  disclose health information (1.1) and manipulate health information (1.2).  From a threat tree standpoint, the 
overall outcome of threatening a health information asset, the root node, can be accomplished in two ways, either through 
data disclosure or data manipulation, its direct descendant child notes.  These child nodes are broken down further. 
An overview of the health information threat tree, depicted in indented outline form, is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
threat id node type - outline number - threat action   
1 O 1 threaten health information asset   
2  O 1.1 disclose health information   
3   O 1.1.1 on the inside    
4    T 1.1.1.1 by accident   
5    O 1.1.1.2 due to curiosity   
15     T 1.1.1.2.1 post patient X-rays on the Internet 
16     T 1.1.1.2.2 disclose photos of patient taken with a hidden camera 
6    T 1.1.1.3 through subornation of insider  
7   O 1.1.2 on the outside    
8    T 1.1.2.1 by hacking   
9    T 1.1.2.2 by unauthorized access  
10    T 1.1.2.3 by trespassing   
11    T 1.1.2.4 by theft    
12    T 1.1.2.5 by information extortion  
13    T 1.1.2.6 by impersonation   
27    T 1.1.2.7 by tracking patient   
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26    T  1.1.2.8 by extrapolation  
14  T 1.2 manipulate health information   
17   T 1.2.1 by vandalism    
18   O 1.2.2 by loss or corruption of data  
19    T 1.2.2.1 due to faulty hardware  
20    T 1.2.2.2 due to faulty software  
21    T 1.2.2.3 due to human 
error 
 
 
22    T 1.2.2.4 due to malware   
23    T 1.2.2.5 due to a natural disaster  
24    T 1.2.2.6 due to a database attack  
25    T 1.2.2.7 due to unauthorized access  
 
Figure 1. A Health Information Security Threat Tree 
 
Organizing Threats 
For the health information threat catalog to be useful for risk assessment, it needs to document more than just what is shown 
in the Figure 1 threat tree.  Risk assessment requires an understanding of the threat source and threat action and how that 
source can trigger or exploit a vulnerability in a health information asset.  As such, we have defined a set of fundamental 
threat attributes.  Besides a unique identifier used to catalog, the threat, and its tree-related attributes, node type and outline 
number, we document the threat source and action, the health information asset and how it is vulnerable.  Finally, we 
document potential controls to mitigate the threat, and provide a descriptive scenario of at least one example, real or 
hypothetical, of a threat incident.   
 
Threat Modeling Examples 
Examples of documented threats for three nodes are provided.  Tables 1 through 3 document selected threats shown in the 
tree above as nodes 1.1.1.2, 1.1.2.7, and 1.1.2.8, respectively.  There is an insider disclosure threat and two different types of 
outsider disclosure threats. 
 
Threat Attribute Value 
ID-Node Type-Outline No. 5 – O – 1.1.1.2 
Source Human-deliberate insider 
Action Disclose health information due to 
curiosity 
Health Information Asset Patients and their families, patient 
information 
Vulnerability Difficulty controlling information 
residing in mobile or networked 
devices 
Potential Controls Require that only facility-owned 
equipment be used for photos; 
train personnel on mobile device 
awareness; conduct random tests 
of awareness policy 
Scenario(s) Nurses at a health clinic were 
dismissed for posting patient X-
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rays, taken with a cell phone, on 
the Internet; in another case, 
employees of a health care facility 
in Florida took photos of a shark 
attack victim with their personal 
cell phones (Shepherd 2010) 
Table 1 - Insider Disclosure Threat 
Disclose Health Information Due to Curiosity 
Disclosure of health information due to curiosity is an insider threat, motivated by curiosity, and carried out by taking 
advantage of insider access.  Insiders can include employees of the health care institution, patients, visitors, and any other 
outsiders, such as vendors, that are provided authorized access to health care facilities.  The mid-level node, 1.1.1.2, and its 
two siblings, are organized around the motivation of the insiders to disclose.  Insiders may either disclose accidentally, 
deliberately by subornation of another insider, or deliberately due to curiosity.  The 1.1.1.2 node models the personal 
curiosity motivation.  Medical personnel or other insiders abuse their insider access out of curiosity or for their own purposes. 
Some do so out of concern for the well being of fellow employees or family members. Some want to know about celebrities 
being treated. Some may be concerned about the possibility of sexually transmitted diseases in a colleague they are dating.  
Actions that may be taken include accessing computer records, or taking and releasing photos of patients, their injuries, or 
their records, and then releasing these photos.  The scenario in Table 1 describes two published incidents where insiders used 
their personal cell phones with built-in cameras to disclose patient information.  The vulnerability is the difficulty in 
controlling the small and thus easily concealable, and also wireless and Internet-connected devices.  The potential controls 
suggested include policies against the use of personal phones, as well as awareness, testing, and enforcement of policies.   
 
Threat Attribute Value 
ID-Node Type-Outline No. 27 – T – 1.1.2.7 
Source Human-deliberate outsider 
Action Disclose patient location and 
health information by tracking 
patient or patient-related 
equipment 
Health Information Asset Patient information  
Vulnerability Difficulty in securing information 
transmitted wirelessly 
Potential Controls Require all wireless transmissions 
be encrypted.  Avoid weak 
encryption methods such as WEP.  
Restrict access to tracking 
software to only those who need it 
to do their job. 
Scenario(s) Some hospital systems use RFID 
(both active and passive) 
technology to track assets within 
and across their facilities.  For 
instance, intravenous (IV) pumps 
and blood pressure monitors can 
be equipped with RFID active 
transmitters and located wherever 
they travel within the health 
system.  These transmitters often 
operate using existing 802.11 
networks.  An intruder who gains 
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access to the software tracking 
application would be able to track 
a patient as he/she is transferred 
within and between member 
hospitals.  The intruder could also 
gain access to medications 
delivered by the IV pump. 
Table 2 - Tracking a Patient Threat 
Disclose Health Information on the Outside by Tracking Patient 
Whereas the insider disclosure threat modeled threats committed by inside threat-sources, there are also disclosure threats 
committed by outside threat sources.  The 1.1.2 branch models these threats, and the next two detailed threats come from this 
branch.  In this branch, disclosure of health information is motivated by malicious intent.  An outsider to a medical 
information system can pose a threat to health information by accessing health information in the following ways: 
• Hacking 
• Unauthorized access 
• Trespassing 
• Theft 
• Information extortion 
• Impersonation/identity theft 
• Patient tracking 
• Extrapolation 
The terms "hack" and "hacking" are used to refer to a modification of a program or device to give the user access to features 
that were otherwise unavailable, such as by circuit bending. This gives a hacker open access to the patient’s personal and 
medical data which can be misused by the hacker.  An unauthorized read access to the data may lead to data disclosure. 
Vindictive former employees, angry patients, network intruders, or others may steal information, damage systems, or disrupt 
operations.  With the computing devices and storage devices becoming smaller yet powerful with vast storage, these devices 
are becoming easier to steal and easier for attackers to use to steal the patient personal and medical information. Information 
extortion occurs when an attacker either threatens to steal, or actually steals, information from a company, or for agreeing not 
to disclose the information.  Identity theft is gaining access to another person’s details to gain access to the patient personal 
and medical details. This can be done by stealing the authentication details to of a person from inside the patient care 
institution and accessing the databases of the institution to gather the information. 
From our list of outside disclosure threats, we now describe two:  patient tracking an extrapolation.  An example of patient 
tracking involves radio frequency identification (RFID) technology.  RFID technology allows healthcare providers to keep 
track of equipment, consumables, and even patients and staff, but this information can cause privacy concerns when it is not 
kept secure from those outside the organization that do not have a legitimate need to see this information.  Outsiders include 
individuals not affiliated with the organization that are motivated by curiosity, intent to harm, or intent to gain financial or 
other advantage through the illicit use of data they acquire.  One form of tracking involves determining the patient’s current 
location in a facility by querying the RFID tag attached to either the patient themselves or a piece of equipment that is 
attached to the patient for the duration of their stay (e.g. IV pump).  Another form of tracking is accessing drug and dosage 
information stored in an IV pump connected to a patient. The vulnerability is the difficulty in securing wireless broadcasts 
against interception by outsiders and securing the tracking application on the organization’s network.  The potential controls 
suggested include the use of encryptions methods and restricting access to RFID tracking applications running on the 
network. 
The vulnerabilities exist because of the difficulties in preventing and detecting the various unauthorized disclosures.  In the 
case of the patient tracking example in Table 2 above, the vulnerability is the difficulty in securing wireless transactions, and 
one suggested control is the use of encryption.   
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Threat Attribute Value 
ID-Node Type-Outline No. 26 – T – 1.1.2.8 
Source Human-deliberate outsider 
Action Disclose health information on the 
outside by extrapolation 
Health Information Asset Violation of patient anonymity 
Vulnerability Difficult to control (a) linkage of 
medical records to public data 
sources and (b) disclosure of 
sensitive information through data 
mining technology 
Potential Controls Design software to accurately 
identify true violations in patient 
anonymity, maximize the amount 
of released data, and maintain to 
the greatest extent the integrity of 
the released data 
Scenario(s) Medical record of William Weld, 
former governor of MA, was 
identified through linkage with the 
voter registration list for 
Cambridge, MA (Sweeney, 2002) 
Table 3 – Disclosure by Extrapolation Threat 
 
Disclose Health Information on the Outside by Extrapolation 
While tracking the patient is one way for an outsider to access and ultimately disclose health information, tracking and 
linking patient data through extrapolation is yet another.  When such extrapolation techniques are carried out successfully by 
attackers, the patient’s anonymity is violated. 
 
 
Figure 1 - A potential threat to patient privacy 
 
Health-care organizations frequently collect and distribute person-specific data for use in medical research as well as for use 
in formulating local, state, and national health-care policies. Under existing guidelines, health-care organizations frequently 
disclose person-specific data for purposes unrelated to treatment, payment, or health-care operations based on the removal of 
attributes that could potentially be used to identify specific individuals. The removal of such attributes is frequently based 
Patient ID 
Admit Date 
Primary Diagnosis  
Primary Procedure 
ZIP 
Birth date 
Gender 
 
Name 
Address 
Register Date 
Party Affiliation 
Date Last Voted 
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upon guidelines referred to as the safe harbor provision1. Unfortunately, in some instances data are unnecessarily removed 
resulting in the release of data that do not satisfy the information needs of the requesting parties (Benitez, Loukides  and 
Malin, 2010).  
 
Figure 2 - A violation in patient anonymity 
Violations in anonymity can occur when person-specific data records are uniquely joined with external datasets containing 
explicit identifiers. Figure-1 illustrates this potential threat to privacy through the joining of medical claims records with 
publicly available voter registration records (Sweeney 2002). In this instance a voter registration record can be linked to a 
medical claims record using the attribute set {ZIP, BirthDate, Gender}. Such an attribute set is referred to as a quasi-
identifier. Defining a quasi-identifier only as those attributes on which two datasets can be joined is limiting and ignores 
cases such as the one shown in Figure-2. In this example, the attributes Drug and Disease are being used to join two datasets, 
by applying domain knowledge, or knowledge discovered through data mining technology, to infer that Drug B is linked to 
disease A. That is, anonymity holds, separately, in the two data sets prior to the introduction or discovery of the relationship 
between Drug B and Disease A. With knowledge of this relationship, however, the anonymity property can be violated, in 
part, through the linkage of the records, <ZIP:021xx, Gender:male, DOB:1964> and <ZIP:02141, Gender:person, 
DOB:1964> to produce the derived patient record <Zip:02141, Gender: male, DOB: 1964>. Subsequently, the derived record 
could be linked to publicly available datasets resulting in the violation of a patient’s anonymity. 
Using the Threat Tree 
The systematic modeling of health information threats described in this paper will support analysts in the evaluation of health 
information risk.  By using a common structure in which to describe risk-related data on threats, we enable a comparative 
assessment of risk. Such as comparison informs the risk analyst so that a threats may be analyzed, vulnerabilities prioritized, 
and countermeasures selected based on some efficient means, such as cost-benefit analysis.   The assessment of risk may be 
made using either a quantitative or qualitative approach, whereby calculated risk is a function of the probability of a threat’s 
occurrence and the severity of the consequences—or impact—should the threat occur.  The implementation of risk analysis 
might result in probability, impact, and risk being added as attributes added to each threat.  Tables 1 through 3 provide 
examples of threat attributes for three specific threats.  Probability, impact, and risk would be added to those listed in the 
tables.   
Because the threat catalog uses accepted categorical frameworks for organizing threats, there is the potential for creating a 
comprehensive catalog that would be applicable at the national level, and could inform public policy on health information 
security and privacy.  Certainly, the catalog would be of value to risk analysts employed on behalf of health care institutions, 
who would use selective portions of the catalog to model the local institution’s threat landscape.  The catalog would also be 
useful for extending the breadth and depth of health information security and privacy research.   
A continuous approach to health information security is urged in keeping with the idea that information security is an 
escalating war.  As technologies change, and associated changes occur in the behavior of attackers, new threats invariably 
will emerge.  The catalogs, extensible as they are with the tree as an organizing framework, can and must be updated. 
CONCLUSION 
In our effort to create a comprehensive catalog of health information security and privacy threats, we have: 
• begun constructing a catalog using a risk management approach to health care information security and privacy 
                                                          
1
 http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. 
  
ZIP: 021xx  
Gender: male   
DOB: 1964  
ZIP: 02141  
Gender: person   
DOB: 1964  
Drug B  Disease A  
  A Threat Tree for Health Information Security and Privacy 
 
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan August 4th-7th 2011 8 
• described threats documented in the catalog 
• explained how the threat tree will be useful 
The current threat catalog is far from complete.  The most immediately obvious extension is a third branch on level two for 
availability threats.  Such a threat might be labeled disrupt health information services.  Additional efforts to extend the tree 
would include using the existing frameworks, such as the NIST 800-30 and other literature cited, to systematically account 
for all known threats within sub-categories of the tree.  Then, additional data gathering, using the academic and practitioner 
literature, activity and data flow modeling of health care processes, and perhaps interviews with experts in the field, to model 
additional threats not appearing in the literature.  Eventually, the catalog would have to be validated for correctness and 
completeness.  Approaches to validation might include: comparison of trees to other frameworks, such as government 
standards, the aforementioned frameworks (Stoneburner, et al., 2002; Whitman, 2003) or threat trees in a different domain, 
such as election operations (Pardue, Landry, and Yasinsac, 2009); and expert review.   
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